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This thesis examines the 1980 Cuban refugee operation in
which the United States military was an active participant.
The purpose of this project was to examine the undesirable
phenomena at the refugee centers and develop cultural indi-
cators which may predict their occurrence.
Information was gathered from official records, periodi-
cals, and personal interviews with a variety of participants
These interviews ranged from the refugees themselves, to the
installation commanders. After action reports from both the
Vietnamese and Cuban operation were reviewed in detail.
The results of this project clearly reveal that serious
incidents occurred in all Cuban refugee centers. Cultural
issues surrounding the serious incidents were discussed and
contributing factors developed. An examination of the con-
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A poster distributed by the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees had a picture of Albert Einstein with the
following caption: "It's not a shame to be a refugee, it can
happen to anyone." The damaging effects of brutal uprooting,
of homelessness and, what's worse, being stateless leave
permanent marks on body and soul. [Ref. 1: p. 348]
The fact that millions of men, women and children are
living day to day in crowded refugee camps is a human tragedy
of enormous proportions. To understand just what it means
to be a refugee one must go beyond the numbers, the nationali-
ties and ideologies, and focus on the simple fact that refu-
gees were ordinary human beings long before they were refugees
Like all people, they were born into families and communities
and adhered to traditional cultural beliefs. Confucius said:
"Nature of men is identical; what divides them is their
customs." [Ref. 2: p. ii]
Throughout the history of mankind, people have been up-
rooted against their will. Time and again lives and values,
built from generation to generation, have been shattered
without warning. Time and again, people in fear, individuals
or groups persecuted on account of their profound convictions
have had to make a most dramatic decision: to take the
10

uncertain, even perilous road to exile, from home and com-
munity and homeland, from friends and often family, rather
than bear the intolerable burdens of injustice and oppression.
[Ref. 3: p. i]
The United States is by far the largest contributor to
organizations assisting refugees. The United States also
leads the world in total number of refugees resettled. For
example, in FY-81, ending September 30, 1981, the U.S. ad-
mitted 154,000 legal refugees although 217,000 were authorized
[Ref. 4: p. 39]
B. HISTORICAL MILITARY PARTICIPATION
The United States history of refugee operations dates
back to the time of the Indians' movement from their homeland.
The Indian Removal Act in 1830 began the first major involve-
ment of the United States military in refugee operations.
Initially the Bureau of Indian Affairs was established in the
War Department, and even when it was moved to the Department
of the Interior, the United States military constantly played
a part in the enforcement of the reservation boundaries.
These reservations were foreign to the Indians and could be
considered the first large scale United States military in-
volvement in refugee operations.
The military has been continually saddled with the mission
of establishing refugee centers. This is illustrated by the
recent refugee operations in Korea and Vietnam. The military
11

played an integral part in the success or failure of these
operations. In the last ten years the military has been
given the mission to operate centers for the Vietnamese
"boat people" and the Cuban "freedom floatilla". While the
mandate of the military is far from clear and its field of
responsibility is not well defined, the probability is high
that United States military will function as an essential
factor in any future mass influx of refugees.
C. "FREEDOM FLOATILLA"
This thesis focuses on the latest major refugee operation
involving the United States military and numerous volunteer
and governmental agencies. Over 1 million Cubans left their
homeland between the revolution in 1959 and the start of the
1980 boatlift. Of this number approximately 850,000 came to
the United States as refugees. In April of 1980, the massive
influx of over 125,000 undocumented Cubans coming by small
boat from the port of Maried provided a massive challenge for
the people of the United States and the agencies which played
an integral part in the creation and operation of the centers
This ragtag armada of fishing boats loaded with refugees
placed the President of the United States in a dilemma. An
effort to block entry of large numbers of refugees fleeing
communist oppression would be seen by many as a retreat from
his longstanding human-rights commitment. On the other hand,
the President had to decide if the American society could
12

absorb the massive influx of Cuban immigrants during a period
of economic uncertainty. On 4 April, the United States agreed
to accept 10,000 Cuban dissidents who were seeking refuge in
the Peruvian embassy. Because of their activity in Cuba,
Castro challenged the Carter administration on 22 April to
accept as many Cuban refugees as could find passage [Ref. 5:
P. 41].
D. THESIS INTENT
The intent of this thesis is to develop the cultural
indicators which may predict undesirable phenomena inside
refugee centers. During the initial phase of refugee opera-
tions, emotions and anxiety levels are high and certainty is
at best ambiguous. The smallest of actions by either the
refugees or the administrators may result in an undesirable
phenomenon. "Undesirable phenomenon" or a serious incident
is defined as any event which poses an active threat to
established law and order within the center and which endan-
gers the well-being of the refugees, civilians and military
personnel. These serious incidents range from illicit
sexual acts to full gang warfare. These incidents proved to
be dysfunctional to meet the needs of a smooth and orderly
resettlement process.
The initial definition was derived from official mili-
tary message traffic which was reported to higher headquarters
13

If nothing more, this thesis will provide a unique ar-
chival document of the Cuban refugee operation analyzed from
multiple sources and perspectives. It is hoped that a common
list of cultural and behavioral indicators which lead to
serious incidents will be revealed. This list of serious
incident predictors should be of value to those who are given
the mission to establish a refugee center.
E. RELEVANCE OF THESIS
The most important aspect of any refugee operation is
failure to learn from previous experiences. The Cuban oper-
ation indicated that camps are still laid out in grid fashion,
despite the preponderance of evidence suggesting that this
is the worst possible layout. Refugee camp management and
administration is often unenlightened with respect to refugee
culture, customs and communication patterns.
Recent events in the world often have had tragic conse-
quences for those forced to flee their native lands. Refugees
are casualties of war and peace. Victims of violence of
every kind--wars, revolutions, struggles for political power,
border settlements and peace treaties. While such research
does not lend itself to formal generalizable propositions,
it intends to give the "feeling for the situation" of the
refugee engaged in what may be a dehumanizing process. Refu-
gees are just ordinary people in extraordinary circumstances




Management of refugee centers has had historically one
goal, that is to provide a holding area which will sustain
the refugees for a short time until a sponsor can be found.
More enlightened managers have realized that some refugees
could become valuable resources. Helping the refugees adjust
and teaching them how to become valuable citizens may be
beneficial to the host country in the long term.
The cultural issues and concepts we are attempting to
analyze in this thesis may have applications in any environ-
ment involving the interaction of two different cultures.
The factors contributing to the "undesirable phenomena" in a
refugee center may be found today in any inner city in the
United States and in military operations overseas.
F. DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
The introductory chapter of this thesis presents a brief
history of military involvement in refugee operations while
establishing the importance of such an operation.
Chapter II is a brief review of existing literature in
the field of refugee operations and cross-cultural conflicts.
The authors analyzed the refugee operation through a multi-
tude of cultural concepts formulated by anthropologist E. T.
Hall. They are discussed in greater detail in this chapter.
Chapter III is a description of the methodology employed
to accomplish the data gathering for the results and analysis
15

Chapters IV and V contain the results and analysis. The
results are analyzed in Chapter V applying the cultural con-
cepts discussed in Chapter II. The results are examined for
generalizability to cross-cultural interaction.
Chapter VI, the conclusion, includes a list of serious
incidents as well as a list of indicators for these incidents
A series of questions is provided as a tool to aid management




A number of journals and documents have been published
concerning the plight of refugees. Few of these documents
concern themselves with the task of establishing or operating
a refugee center. Those that do address this critical issue
are usually documents of times, dates, and places, with little
or no consideration given to the refugees' perspective.
This thesis focuses on the most recent literature avail-
able concerning refugee operations. The primary literature
sources are official after action reports, periodicals, and
published works concerning culture, learning, and communica-
tion. E. T. Hall is a major contributor.
A. EDWARD SAPIR
Edward Sapir revolutionized linguistic theory and ulti-
mately language teaching methods as a direct consequence of
having to deal with problems that come from the study of the
"primitive language" [Ref. 7: p. 72]. He is famous for being
the man who laid foundations of modern descriptive linguistics
[Ref. 7: p. 85]
.
Sapir also investigated phenomena concerning the relation
of man to the so-called objective world. He suggests it is
quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality
essentially without the use of language and that language is
17

merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of
communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that
the "real world" is to a large extent built on the language
of groups. [Ref. 8: p. 87]
In his writings, he stressed that the concept of language
is the greatest force of socialization. The fact that a com-
mon speech serves as a peculiarly potential symbol of the
social solidarity of those who speak the language. He dealt
with the psychological significance of common speech and the
subform of a language which is current among a group of people
who are held together by ties of common interest. [Ref. 9:
p. 15] These groups of people are influenced greatly by the
makeup of their language, their vocabulary, and their grammar.
Many English speaking people lose sight of this fact. Since
language according to Sapir is the greatest force of social-
ization, its impact on refugee operations must be considered.
B. SIGMUND FREUD
A psychologist whose works addressed the conscious and
unconscious levels in cultural communications was Sigmund
Freud. Freud distinguished between conscious and unconscious
material. His achievement was his elaborate analysis of the
role of the unconscious. Freud relied heavily on the com-
municative significance of man's acts rather than his words.
[Ref. 7: p. 83]
18

Freud was seen by some to lack in only one area- -that
was his theory of communication. Ultimately everything man
does involves interaction with someone else. Interaction
lies at the hub of the universe of culture and everything
grows from it. This interaction can not take place if there
is a lack of communication or difficulties in communication
in intercultural relations.
C. D. F. KUNZ
One theorist who has specifically studied the refugee
problem is D. F. Kunz . In his book The Refugee in Flight:
Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement
, Kunz suggests
refugee movement can be classified as anticipatory and acute.
Anticipatory refugees are those who leave their home in an
orderly way after some type of preparation. Acute refugees
are those who flee in the wake of massive political and mili-
tary upheaval. These refugees flee en masse or in bursts of
groups with emphasis on escape. Kunz also suggests that acute
refugees may face more difficult problems of adjustment than
anticipatory groups. [Ref. 10: p. 58] Once the movement of
these refugees is complete, the refugees merge and form unique
groups. The Cuban refugee movement was composed of both acute
and anticipatory refugees.
D. BATTELLE COLUMBUS LABS
A group of researchers from the Battelle company developed





which concerns the role of the military in
the case of an armed conflict. Key to our interest in this
study are chapters dedicated to the handling and movement of
refugees. These chapters may be applied directly to the
Cuban refugee movement concerning the cultural phenomena
which existed.
One of the gravest mistakes which might be made in civil
affairs operations is to approach a heterogenous, complex
society as if it were a homogenous, simplistic mass of people.
Along with the anticipated problems of status differential
along the lines of political beliefs, economic worth, and
social station, societies can be further stratified along
such lines as religion, ethnicity, and race [Ref. 11: p. 93].
Without understanding these different aspects of culture,
the potential for conflict is greatly increased. Each society
is characterized by a set of loyalties of beliefs, ideals,
institutions, groups, and individuals. These must be taken
into consideration.
In conjunction with the cultural problems, proximic
problems are discussed in the Battelle study. If people are
to work effectively in densely populated areas (e.g. a refu-
gee center), they must bridge the gap between spatial thinking
dealing with the physical environment and spatial thinking
dealing with values.
The study suggests that densely populated areas have
three aspects that change over time and that must be
20

considered: Normative or cultural aspects, functional or
organizational aspects, and the physical aspects [Ref. 11:
p. 8]. These ideas are parallel to "TRIAD" concepts dis-
cussed in Section F-2 of this chapter.
E. AFTER ACTION REPORTS
Little has been written concerning either of the last
two military involved refugee operations, the Vietnamese
"boat people" and Cuban "freedom floatilla", other than after
action and news reports. The official after action reports
provide some insight into problems but it is limited to the
perspective of the "officials".
After action reports were obtained from four Cuban centers
and four Vietnamese centers. Although these reports are
largely written as factual histories, some insight into cul-
tural problems is presented. The logistic problems were
considered immense, but solvable. An examination of the
serious events and problems presented in both operations
reveal some identical cultural factors and will be used for
comparison throughout this thesis. Considerable documenta-
tion was found concerning the following refugee centers:
Fort Indiantown Gap (Vietnamese, May-December 1975), Fort
Indiantown Gap (Cuban, May-October 1980), Fort Chaffee
it
The authors suggest the three levels of the TRIAD are
similar to the three aspects that change over time. The
formal level is similar to the normative or cultural aspects,
the informal level to the functional, and technical level
to the physical aspects.
21

(Vietnamese, April-December 1975), Fort Chaffee (Cuba, May-
February 1980), Eglin Air Force Base (Vietnamese, April-
August 1975), Eglin Air Force Base (Cuban, May-September
1980), Camp Orte (Vietnamese, April-June 1975), and Fort
McCoy (Cuban, May-October 1980).
Of special interest in all of the after action reports
was the section provided by the G-5 , or Civil Affairs staff,
Their insights and perceptions were critical to the success
of refugee operations.
F. EDWARD T. HALL
Edward T. Hall, an anthropologist, is the theorist whose
ideas closely align themselves with the direction of this
thesis. His theory includes how people from different cul-
tures have unconscious, ingrained assumptions about personal
space, interpersonal relations, and the function of time.
Those different assumptions work to make misunderstandings
between peoples likely and destructive. He stated that cul-
ture has three levels: formal, informal, and technical.
Hall believes that a culture is made up of formal behavior
patterns that contribute a core around which there are cer-
tain informal adaptations. He developed a "TRIAD", which is
a map of the change process of a culture. These theories
The G-5 is the principle staff assistant to the com
mander in all matters pertaining to political, economic,
social, and psychological aspects of military operations
22

will be discussed in greater detail in the paragraphs to
follow.
Edward T. Hall authored three books that provide a frame
of reference to examine refugee centers and operations. The
three books are: The Silent Language
,
(1959), Doubleday and
Company, Inc.; The Hidden Dimension
,
(1966), Doubleday and
Company, Inc.; and Beyond Culture
,
(1977), Anchor Press,
Doubleday. These allow for the development of a method to
analyze serious incidents and cultural problems in the Cuban
operation.
1. Culture
In order to get a grasp on the dynamics of culture
and intercultural relations a sound definition is needed.
Hall defines culture as a complex series of activities inter
related in many ways with origins deeply buried in the past
[Ref. 7: p. 80]. In his book, The Silent Language , Hall
describes how anthropologists perceive culture. "For anthro
pologists, culture has long stood for the way of life of a
people, for the sum of their learned behavior patterns,
attitudes, and material things". [Ref. 7: p. 43]
In his examination, Hall describes peoples' behavior
with regard to time. These behaviors can be classified as
either polychronic or monochronic. A monochronic culture is
one in which the people handle events on an individual and
linear schedule. A polychronic culture is one in which the
23

people seem comfortable immersed in multiple events simul-
taneously. Polychronic cultures are not time intense people,
2. The TRIAD
The TRIAD is a concept which helps explain what must
happen in the change process of different cultures. Culture
in Hall's perspective has three levels: formal, informal,
and technical.
When we view this TRIAD it resembles a pyramid. It
is noted that the formal level of culture makes the largest
portion. Within this level the adult molds the young accord
ing to the pattern he himself has never questioned. Every-
body can depend upon it almost as though it were intuitive.
It is the base from which the rest of the culture springs
and around which it is built [Ref. 7: pp. 91-101].
INFORMAL
FORMAL
Figure 2.1. Cultural TRIAD or Pyramid.
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Informal learning is more within the subliminal
level of consciousness. Mishandling the informal can often
lead to serious difficulties which are apt to become aggra-
vated since the participants in an informal situation are
not fully conscious of what is going on. Our lives are full
of customs which we do not understand. Why we wear neckties
is not understood. We violate these norms, however, at con-
siderable risk. Most of what we know in high context culture
is contained at this level. This is why it is so hard to
discover!
The technical level of culture is reduced to conscious
levels of specific skills and procedures. One can introduce
change in technical frame and not violate the norms of a
culture. Technical changes are small and deal with details
of the operation. They are always conscious [Ref. 7: p. ]08].
The change process is a complex circular process.
It moves from informal to technical and seems to involve all
three levels. The deeper one goes into a particular culture,
the slower any change effort may be expected to take place.
Hall's most helpful advice is to begin with the informal,
attempt to bring particular problems from the informal to
the technical level where they may be consciously acted upon
and changed accordingly.
It is doubtful that anyone can actually change a
culture. What takes place are small incremental changes in
25

the informal level until they "alter" the culture. An exam-
ple of this is the steady improvements in the computer
industry which were undreamed of twenty years ago. On the
other hand, if one wants to help introduce cultural change
he should find out what is happening on the informal level.
Determine which of these informal adaptations are most suc-
cessful, and bring these to an awareness level. This process
will not change culture, but may accelerate the change. It
is this out-of -awareness level in which all change begins.
[Ref. 7: p. 118]
Those who previously studied the past refugee oper-
ations and those who actually operated the centers had little,
if any, idea of how different cultures perceive one another.
The excuse given in almost every operation is that there was
little or no time to review the literature concerning the
cultures. One must be made aware that two cultures treat
the same point of behavior quite differently and structure
the informal level into different parts of their respective
systems. When events of a magnitude such as that of a ref-
ugee operation depend on such small understandings, it seems
transparent that one of the most promising developments in
the intercultural field has to do with research directed
toward bringing informal patterns to a level of awareness.
This is where the problems arise. Hall suggests the informal
expectancy is often ruptured when there is conflict between
26

two patterns within the context of our own culture or in the




In conjunction with this TRIAD, Hall developed con-
cepts to deal with intercultural communications. Hall stated,
"There exists in the world today tremendous distortions in
meaning as men try to communicate to one another. The job
of achieving understanding and insight into mental processes
of others is much more difficult and the situation more seri-
ous than most of us care to admit." The problems involving
communication are a result of the fact that communication
occurs simultaneously on different levels of consciousness,
ranging from full awareness to out of awareness [Ref. 7:
p. 52]. To aid in analyzing communication between cultures,
Hall developed three concepts. These theoretical paradigms
are proxemics, action chains, and the high-low context
spectrum.
a. Proxemics
Proxemics is the study of man's social and per-
sonal space. Hall's proxemic research cast doubts on the
validity of the assumptions that when two human beings exper-
ience the same event, virtually the same data is being fed
to the two brains and recorded similarly. Hall suggests how
proxemic patterns in cultures differ and how use of space
27

is a specialized elaboration of culture [Ref. 8: pp. 1-2].
If the military is tasked to establish refugee centers,
proxemics provides a tool to aid in understanding the refu-
gee's perception of the camp. Hall stated that by examining
proxemic patterns, it is possible to reveal hidden cultural
frames that determine the structure of a given people's
perceptual world. This different perception affects what is
considered crowded living, different interpersonal relations,
and different approaches to those with other proxemic patterns
[Ref. 8: p. 153] .
Hall states territorial behavior for cultures is
fixed and remains reasonably constant as to the locations
for specific activities within one's territory. He also
illustrates how the territory is an extension of the organism
which is marked by visual, vocal, and olfactory signs. This
idea is congruous with the statement made by Sir Winston
Churchill when he said, "We shape our buildings and they shape
us." [Ref. 8: p. 100]
In Hall's book The Hidden Dimension there is a
discussion of crowding and social behavior in animals, which
has direct application on the subject of this thesis. He
discusses Calhoun's 1958 experiments with rats, and crowded
spaces. The effect of crowding produced stress in the rats
and a "behavioral sink" or gross distortion of behavior,
*
Examples are eating, sleeping, and nesting
28

started to appear. This effect increased aggression in the
animals. Two very important observations materialized.
First, that a rat, like man, needs time to be alone, and
secondly, the social rank in a sink is very unstable. [Ref.
8: pp. 24-27]
b. Action Chains
An action chain is a set of sequence of events
in which usually two or more individuals participate. It
resembles a dance, except that it is a dance with a goal.
If we fail to follow the sequence or steps, the chain is
broken and the action must begin over again.
Anglo-American disputes follow in steps from
politeness, to messages via a third party, to verbal con-
frontation, then legal action, and finally, force if nothing
else has worked and if the law is on your side. For Spanish
Americans the sequence is different. First there is brood-
ing where verbal confrontation is to be avoided, and the
first indication that there is a problem is a show of force.
[Ref. 12: p. 57]
As mentioned in the TRIAD, action chains occur
through the three levels of a culture. Hall describes the
continuum of action chains as ranging from those at one end
of the spectrum when the commitment to complete the chain
is haphazard at best, to those at the other end of the spec-
trum, which is a relentless progression set in motion and
there is not any turning away [Ref. 12: p. 146].
29

c. High and Low Context
One of the most useful concepts to describe cul-
tures is the use of the high and low-context spectrum created
by Hall in his book Beyond Culture . "A high-context communi-
cation is either in the physical context or internalized in
the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit,
transmitted part of the message. A low-context communication
or message is just the opposite; i.e., the mass of the infor-
mation is vested in the explicit code." [Ref. 12: p. 91]
While there are no cultures specifically at either extreme
on the scale, some can be considered high while others can
be considered low. For example, Americans, Germans and Swiss
would be considered low context, while Arabic and Japanese
would be considered high-context. The Cuban and Latin culture
would fall somewhere on the right side of the scale. (See
Figure 2.2) According to Hall, the level of context deter-













Figure 2.2. Context Bandwidth
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The language code demonstrates how context is
utilized in the communications of a culture. In low-context
cultures the words carry most of the meaning while in high-
context cultures, less information is carried in the words
and more in the context. Low-context cultures such as ours
deal in specific procedures and legalistic methods, while
high-context cultures are less legalistic and are more influ-
enced by networks of friends and relatives [Ref. 12: p. 107].
Nearly everything in a low-context society can be codified-
-
put into print--while the opposite is true in a high-context




Several other readings provided background for this
thesis. To Serve the Devil , by Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau,
vividly documents the white Americans' racial perceptions of
the history of the minorities in America. Of special note
is the chapter concerning the American Indian with the De-
partment of Interior viewing its role as "paternal". Unlike
the military, they were not committed to the physical destruc
tion of the Indians; all they wanted to do was wipe them out,
culturally, and impose upon them all values of the white
society. [Ref. 2: p. 69]
Another useful document was the United States Army field
manual FM 41-10, (1969) Civil Affairs Operations [Ref. 13].
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This manual is the official reference for G-5/Civil Affairs
personnel in the conduct of civil affairs operations. It
elaborates on the functions of the Civil Affairs units in a
conflict environment. There is little guidance for operations
such as the domestic refugee influx into this country.
A third beneficial work was a collection of articles on
Inter-American cultural factors edited by Samuel Shapiro
[Ref. 14]. This collection centers on how business, politics,
the military, education, and religion have produced a split
in the cultures of the United States with the Latin culture.
H. CRITIQUE - APPLICATION TO THESIS
The literature used in preparation of this thesis is seg-
regated into two distinct categories. The first, composed
largely of the concepts provided by Edward T. Hall, and the
second, the official after action reports. This literature
expresses two diametrically opposed diagnostic lenses. The
after action report being factual and having little cause
and effect relationship between the cultural problems and
Hall's theories and concepts having little direct mention of
refugee operations, but providing in depth thinking into
possible explanation of the refugee phenomena. The authors
hope to investigate the virgin region that links theoretical
thoughts with pragmatic concepts.
The official after action reports played an important
role in data collection by highlighting the events and problems

that occurred, as well as providing insight into our own
culture. These reports reveal the use of a low-context
approach in solving problems with a high-context culture.
The reports also provide substantial data concerning serious
incidents, and is the initial impetus and direction for the
data gathering portion of this thesis.
In summary, Hall suggests a variety of lenses may be
used to examine a change in cultures. For example, the fail-
ure to understand the action chain of the refugee's culture
may contribute to misunderstandings and possible conflict.
The "officials" anticipated the actions of refugees to be
identical to that of North Americans. The concepts of action
chain, high/low context, proxemics, and the TRIAD may help
us develop an underlying cause for conflict in the refugee
centers. In addition, these concepts may help explain why
demonstrations, riots, assaults, and other serious phenomena
suddenly surfaced unexpectedly.
The intention of this thesis is to examine the serious
incidents which occurred at refugee centers through a multi-
ple lens perspective based on the cultural theories of Hall.
Previous researchers have failed to take into consideration
the aspects of both overt and covert culture. Failure to
address cultural considerations when working with different
cultures results in a high risk that conflict may occur.
Culture is the link between human beings and the means they
have of interacting with others. If the inhabitant's culture
33

is not taken into consideration, especially in the dynamic





Since the focus of this thesis concerns a situation not
ongoing; i.e., military involvement in domestic refugee oper-
ations, a historical perspective and largely an archival
strategy limits the research scope. The uniqueness of the
operations resulted in a small number of applicable cases
which may be analyzed. Therefore, the majority of informa-
tion was accumulated from the Cuban and Vietnamese refugee
operations. Information was gathered from a variety of
sources to include: telephone interviews with officials,
after action reports from domestic refugee operations, per-
sonal interviews with officials, current literature, official
message traffic, military manuals, numerous periodical arti-
cles, newspaper articles, unpublished materials obtained
from officials, international organization documents, and
interviews with participants to include refugees.
The research was guided by both the inside and outside
perspective since one of the authors was an active partici-
pant in the Cuban operation. His involvement provided a
unique insight in many of the cultural problems encountered,
Due to the ease of access and availability of data at




but may have been a source of bias during the conduct of the
research. The other author provided the "other perspective"
which was needed for a more objective design.
The first step of the analytic process was to draw a
time line of the operations and identify the undesirable
phenomena which occurred. This process was used as a refer-
ence for the in depth interviews as well as a direction of
the data gleemed from other sources listed.
The focus of the data collection effort was centered on
uncovering the contributing factors for serious incidents.
This list of factors, which were considered to be "contribu-
ting to cultural conflict:, surfaced from the data collected
Using Hall's concepts, the data was analyzed through a cul-
tural lens and critical issues were determined. Carrying
out this process a list of cultural factors was developed
for each event. If the same undesirable phenomena occurred
at different centers and similar cultural factors were iden-
tified to be neglected across the centers, then this would
become a significant consideration to place on a list of
cultural predictors for military staffs.
A critical part of the data collection method is the
role which the authors place on theory. The more explicit
the theory, the more complete the diagnosis and the more
reliable the inquiry. Hall's concepts provided a process to
think through our analytical methods on the front end to




The sample size used for this thesis is limited (n=8)
.
Each center is taken as one independent observation although
many interviews might have been conducted there. These
refugee operations were limited by the fact that the military
staff assigned the mission were active, although reluctant,
players in the operations. Interviews were thus less than
enthusiastic at times. Another weakness identified by the
authors was that the heavy weight of the primary data was
collected at one location, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.
The reliability of the data can be questioned from sev-
eral perspectives. All sources (interviews, official docu-
ments, newspaper articles, official military message traffic)
have a possibility of bias and the effect of time itself
can create bias. All interviews conducted were limited by
the availability of resources and limited access to people.
This could have an affect on the objectivity of the results.
If there was a high degree of correlation among the sources,
then there would be increased internal consistency, thus
increasing its reliability. To aid in maintaining validity,
investigation into primary source data had priority over
secondary source data.
Most of the refugee operations which were used in this
thesis lack adequate systematic data covering the period
immediately after the refugee arrival in the United States.
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Problems with the language and culture severely hampered
efforts of collecting the systematic data from the refugees.
It must be noted the refugee centers were in operation
for a relatively short period of time, thus creating further
difficulties. Another problem found was that the refugee
tends to forget or redefine many of the situations which
they initially encountered. Other material used (newspapers,
magazines, government reports, interviews with government
officials) may focus only on what we (the United States cul-
ture) considers important, sensational and significant. Those
accounts may not accurately reflect the refugees perceptions
of their experiences. Just as in wars, the victors write
the history- -so here the staff writes the after action report.
Content validity would appear to be strong among the
Cuban and Vietnamese refugee operations because the data was
from the entire spectrum of events where all possible centers
were considered. Any application beyond these two cultures
may encounter problems if samples from other refugee opera-
tions are not used.
In the interest of validity, cause and effect relationship
between factors and events was limited. The intent of this
thesis was not to produce a definitive list of cause and
effect factors, but rather a body of cultural factors which
might aid military staffs to improve the operation of the
refugee centers. Universality with cause and effect rela-
tionships was not the primary goal of the thesis; instead,
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this would be a beginning of the documentation of a neglected
topic for future researchers and scholars to address. Per-
haps Hall summed it up best when he said, "When working with
cultural data one can only be precise on one analytical level
at a time and then for only one moment. I call this "cultural
indeterminancy" . [Ref. 7: p. 136] Although it seems the
methodology for the research of this thesis has numerous




IV. RESULTS --THE SERIOUS INCIDENTS
This chapter contains an abridgment of events which are
categorized as serious by the definition presented in the
introduction. The incidents were found in some degree at
all of the refugee centers. They were revealed through pri-
**
mary and secondary source documents. This chapter contains
a factual description of the serious phenomena which include
unauthorized departures, assaults and illegal weapons pos-
session, riots and demonstrations, sexual misconduct, arson,
theft, and self-inflicted wounds.
There are numerous examples of each type of serious inci-
dents. In this chapter the rationale and reasons for the
serious incidents were not included. The important fact is
that they did occur! These incidents were categorized as
serious by the "official" definition and does not represent
the viewpoint of others involved including the refugees . The
contributing factors and reasons will be discussed in the
following chapter.
A. UNAUTHORIZED DEPARTURES
Unauthorized departures, or "fence jumping" as it is







and at times uncontrollable rate. These departures ranged
from individual departures to mass exit attempts. The fol-
lowing example illustrates the seriousness of the problem.
Two Cubans who "jumped the fence" at Fort Indiantown Gap,
Pennsylvania, were apprehended for breaking and entering
the residence of the Lt . Governor of Pennsylvania.
The magnitude of the problem is exemplified by the num-
ber of unauthorized departures which occurred at Fort McCoy
during the period of June 25, 1980, to September 19, 1980.
Over 734 cases of fence jumping were reported, an average
of 19 unauthorized departures per day.
Another type of "fence jumping" occurred between various
sections inside the center. Unauthorized internal movement,
moving into and out of restricted sections, occurred on a
daily basis and created massive accountability problems at
all four centers. Separate sections had to be established
by the management of the center to contain repeat offenders.
B. ASSAULTS/WEAPONS
**
Assaults and the manufacturing and possession of weapons
proved to be an area of great concern for the center's
Computed from official message traffic that was availa-
ble, which averaged 19 cases per day. Data for consecutive
days was not available.
All refugees were searched and all weapons confiscated
upon arrival at the four centers.
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management. Assaults and weapons possession were common
occurrences, especially in the unaccompanied male sections
of the centers.
Assaults ranged from simple fist fight to stabbings and
from sexual molestation to gang rapes. These assaults were
reported throughout the entire population of the centers
even to include the juvenile sections. At Fort McCoy, for
example, there were over 48 cases of reported assaults with
41 refugees being injured. Many serious injuries resulted
from the use of "homemade" or fabricated weapons.
"Homemade" weapons were prevalent at each of the centers.
At Fort Chaffee for example, 1400 homemade weapons were
confiscated during an inspection of the area on June 6, 1980
[Ref. 15: p. I-III-4]. Many knives were taken from the mess
hall and potentially dangerous material was manufactured
into deadly weapons by the refugees. Another example of the
seriousness of the problem occurred at Fort McCoy. One week
after the refugees arrived, a search of four barracks pro-
duced 256 homemade weapons. Weapons continued to be a
major problem throughout the operation at Fort McCoy. Examples
of the types of weapons fabricated in the center are shown
in Figure 4.1.
a
Data computed from available message traffic.
A A
The weapons included knives, puncture type weapons,
razor blades, machetes, and daggers.
AAA
Interview with Civil Affairs Officer, August 21, 1982,
Green Bay, Wisconsin. See Appendix E.
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Figure 4.1. Weapons Confiscated July, 1980, Fort McCoy,
Wisconsin.
The vast number of weapons held by the refugees, and the
number of assaults resulted in managers of the centers spend
ing an inordinate amount of time and resources in an attempt
to control the problem.
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C. RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS
Riots and demonstrations were a particular concern for
the management of all centers. These riots and demonstra-
tions hampered the management effectiveness of the centers,
caused property damage and injuries, and fueled political
pressure from outside sources. During the summer of 1980
the four military centers experienced some form of riot and/
or demonstration demanding deployment of additional security
forces . Following are some specific examples of riots and
demonstrations which occurred at the respective centers.
The examples include the number of refugees involved, the
number of injuries, and the "official rationale" for the
cause
.
1 Eglin Air Force Base-, Florida
At Eglin Air Force Base on May 15, 1980, a rock-
throwing protest occurred involving 200 refugees injuring 3
police and six refugees. The official reason given for the
riot was slow resettlement procedures.
2 Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, had four major incidents,
one in which state troopers actually fired on refugees. The
first riot involved between 200 to 300 young male refugees
and occurred on May 26, 1980. The riot occurred across from
*
In a demonstration no property or persons are harmed; a








Figure 4.2. Location of the Major Cuban Refugee Centers.
the reception area for visiting families and apparently began
when visiting families demanded the release of family mem-
bers detained in the center. The refugees crossed rope bar-
riers and left the centers with the result that four Cubans
received injuries. The refugees who did not participate
restored the overturned barriers.
Two days later a demonstration occurred involving an
estimated 1,200 refugees. Just as with the previous incident,
the cause given by officials was a result of slow out-processing
procedures (only 205 out of 18,843 were out-processed) [Ref.
15: p. V-I-A-4], The crowd dispersed after Cuban-Americans
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entered the center to answer questions and explain procedures
to the refugees
.
The next night a crowd gathered and requested to
speak to the two Cuban -Americans and then dispersed still
frustrated with the slow out-processing procedures. During
the same evening 150 to 200 refugees peacefully demonstrated
along the main street of the post.
On May 31, 1980, 50 to 70 refugees stoned a United
States Marshall's vehicle. This occurred when the marshalls
apprehended one refugee for assaulting a military policeman.
While this incident was in progress the military police de-
tected a refugee starting a fire between the buildings and
he was taken into custody.
At 1930 hours on June 1, 1980, approximately 1,000
Cubans marched to the Fort Chaffee main gate. For reasons
unknwon, the Arkansas state troopers opened fire and injured
five Cubans. Following this incident two buildings were
destroyed by arson. Additional army and reserve component
units were then requested and deployed to Fort Chaffee.
3 . Fort McCoy, Wisconsin
At Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, on the evening of August
13, 1980, a group of 20 refugees armed with homemade weapons
apparently attacked another group during a movie. A series
of clashes erupted involving of up to 50 to 60 refugees. A
military police reaction force had to be employed at the
request of the United States Marshalls. By 0215 hours the
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disturbances were over and 20 refugees were treated for
injuries. The next day (August 14) two buildings were burned,
one damaged extensively with arson suspected in both cases.
On September 7, 1980, approximately 300 refugees
began demonstrating against the slow out-processing procedures
The demonstration began with 50 to 60 refugees carrying
signs stating their desire to be resettled (See Figure 4.2).
There were rumors among the refugees that one of the volun-
teer agencies (VOLAG) was selling sponsorships which fueled
the demonstrations. As the crowd formed it began to shake
the fence and eventually tore down the fence surrounding the
male compound. Riot control agents were used on a limited
basis in one area to turn back a group of refugees attempt-
ing to enter another section of the center. All available
personnel in the military police battalion and the infantry
battalion were committed to cordon the disturbance area, and
by 2030 hours the disturbances was controlled. That evening
two recreation buildings were burned. On September 8, 1980,
another building was burned with arson suspected in all three
fires
.
On September 8, 1980, a group of 100 refugees began
to move through the male compound. Military police and infan-
try troops were quick to seal the area and restore order.
Twenty-three instigators were apprehended with five military
police receiving minor injuries.
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Figure 4.3. A Demonstration, September 3, 1980, Fort
McCoy, Wisconsin.
D. OTHER
There were numerous other incidents which caused great
concern in the operation of the refugee centers. These inci-
dents differ from those previously discussed in that a single
refugee rather than a group of refugees was involved. Many
of these incidents occurred on a daily basis and were con-
sidered commonplace to some. For the purpose of this thesis
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these incidents will be categorized as "other" and examples
are listed below.
1 . Sexual Misconduct
The fact that the population of refugees contained a
number of homosexuals is not in itself a serious incident.
The actions that took place, however, did cause a great deal
of anxiety among the refugees and administrators. For exam-
ple, at Fort McCoy it was frequently observed by civilian
employees and refugees that numerous gatherings of homosexuals
occurred in a certain section of the center known as "Queer
Hill". It was at this location where homosexual misconduct
allegedly occurred.
Other examples of sexual misconduct which occurred
at the centers included prostitution, indecent exposure, and
numerous rapes. For example, at one center the installation
commander observed a refugee standing on top of a building
masturbating while eating a light bulb. It was not infrequent
for masturbation and indecent exposure to occur in the pres-
ence of female employees during meal hours. One female worker
was bitten on the buttocks while serving meals at a dining
facility. While these incidents caused concern it was per-
ceived little could be done to control them.
*
"Other" incidents in this context include sexual mis




Arson occurred at the centers while the refugees'
population was involved in riots or demonstrations. Cases
of arson ranged from the burning of barracks and administra-
tion buildings to small fires between buildings. One admini-
stration building was completely destroyed and fire officials
concluded it was ignited by gasoline. Prior to this incident
it was reported to administration officials that refugees
were stealing gasoline with the intent to manufacture incen-
diary devices.
3. Theft
Thefts were a common occurrence at each center. The
spectrum of thefts ranged from minor items such as government
issued cigarettes to major high dollar items such as a
Pennsylvania fish and game vehicle. Knives, which were used
in the dining facilities, were a popular item stolen. These
knives, in conjunction with homemade weapons, were used in
many of the documented assaults. The thefts which occurred
were too numerous to be physically documented and as a result,




There were numerous self-inflicted wounds which
occurred from the assaults and fights within each center.
These wounds included slashed wrists, slashed arms, and a
cut abdomen. One refugee was found hanging from the fire
escape with a rope made from sheets tied around his neck.
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Another example occurred when a refugee died from his sue
cessful suicide attempt when he jumped from a tree.
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V. DISCUSSION— CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
In this chapter the rationale for the serious incidents
which occurred at all four centers will be analyzed in
greater detail. Why were there rapes, unauthorized depar-
tures, a large number of assaults, a sophisticated weapons
fabrication industry, riots, demonstrations, and suicide
attempts? The documented explanations of these serious inci-
dents in the past have been far too simple in that they fail
to adequately consider the culture of the refugee. Many of
the "official" reasons given for the occurrence of the serious
incidents only scratch the surface of answering the question,
why did they occur? We want to go beyond the superficial
reasons found by officials and ask why these incidents took
place. The incidents were examined through a cultural lense
with primary and secondary source documents laying the foun-
dation for analysis.
The perception of many officials regarding refugee oper-
ations is that they occur only once. This operation, as
stated by a military official, is "unique" due to the fact
that the slice of the population was atypical when compared
to other refugee populations. He indicated that the serious
incidents which occurred in the Cuban operation can not be
generalized to other operations.





Not true. Refugee managers have faced the same serious
incidents in past refugee operations with a population that
was considered a representative slice of the refugee's cul-
ture. Investigations into other operations has revealed that
the same serious incidents, problems, and ill fated admini-
strative policies occurred in the Vietnamese operation of
the 1970' s, the Cuban operation of the 1980 's, and the Hatian
operation of today. One conclusion which can be drawn from
these operations is that we have failed to learn from past
experiences
.
The occurrence of serious incidents was cause for a pri-
mary focus of efforts by the managers and administrators of
the centers. An inordinate amount of time was wasted reacting
to serious incidents rather than managing the refugee popu-
lation. Are there specific indicators which can be identified
which contributed to the serious incidents? Were cultural
considerations involved in the policy and management decisions?
It is hoped the indicators presented in this chapter will




During the course of this investigation the most frequently
found basis contributing to serious incidents of all types
was the demographic makeup of the population. The interviews,
press, and official documents all specify that serious
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incidents resulted from the large number of "undesirables"
that left Cuba voluntarily or by force. It is well documented
that homosexuals, criminals, the mentally ill, and prostitutes
were among the refugees who were processed at the centers.
It is interesting to note that Castro classified all of these
refugees as parasites during a radio address in May 1980,
stating, "now Cuba has freed itself of its parasites."
In retrospect one could easily be persuaded that demo-
graphics was the major plausible factor contributing to
serious incidents during the Cuban operation. A detailed
investigation reveals other relevant issues that must be
addressed, and to blame demographics alone for all of the
ills of the refugee centers if far too simple.
1 . Classification
The classification of the refugee had direct impact
on the person's assignment to a living area. This assignment
generated the refugees' environment and created a catalyst
for serious incidents. The initial demographic classification
was a problem for all of the centers. At Fort Chaffee, for
example, the lack of refugee demographic data prior to the
start of the sustained refugee flow made it extremely diffi-
cult to plan and prepare for the segregation of family groups,
unattached males, and unattached females into separate
"neighborhoods". [Ref. 15: p. I-VII-M-1]




The prevalent demographic characteristic was the
large percentage of males. At Fort McCoy and Fort Indian-
town Gap the male population exceeded 90% and 80% respectively.
A survey taken at the Eglin Center indicated the population
consisted of 89.3% males, 64% of those being between the ages
of 20 and 34 [Ref. 16: p. 42]. This large all male population
made placement of refugees into our society difficult as
opposed to the family groups who were readily accepted and
sponsored by the American people. The fact that the Cuban
population was mostly unattached males may have contributed
to the perception that they were "misfits" or "undesirable".
While it seemed logical to segregate into the cate-
gories of family, unattached males, unattached females, and
eventually juveniles without parent or guardian; the question
is why should we segregate at all? Segregation was justified
as a means of control and ensuring a "moral" environment.
Applying our cultures' definition to another culture can be
elucidated by the criterion used for determining classification
of "family" and "juvenile". In our culture the family means
husband, wife, and children, while the Cuban culture the
family has a much broader connotation and includes aunts,
uncles, and cousins. In a legalistic society defining a
juvenile is rather simple- -anyone under 18 years of age.
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But in Cuba many of the juveniles were on their own and had
*
been totally self sufficient for years.
The creation of "neighborhoods" by a rigid low-context
system can be considered a primary cause for the continuous
fence jumping. Males continually moved from assigned areas
into family areas and unattached female areas. All of the
centers experienced some form of unauthorized refugee move-
ment. This movement resulted in prostitution, acts of violence,
constant tension and frustration [Ref. 17: p. 31]. While
there may have been options to the classification and initial
assignments, would the American public accept juveniles or
single females housed with the males? Compounding the
situation- -the refugees failed to see fence jumping as bad.
There are great individual and cultural differences
in spatial needs. The families were given a larger living
space and some privacy, while unaccompanied males were housed
in long rows of crowded barracks laid out in grid fashion.
There were wide differences in the refugee population, as
mentioned earlier. According to E. T. Hall, aggression often
increases when living in close quarters. In such circumstances,
man's energies must be tuned to channeling aggression so that
The term "street kids" was used by many of the people
interviewed to describe the juveniles.
**




it is not continually being triggered [Ref. 12: p. 138].
Little effort was made in channeling the refugee's aggression
because their stay was thought to be temporary.
One variable overlooked initially at Fort McCoy was
the internal Cuban demographic based on geography. For exam-
ple, the gangs and groups from Havana had a hatred or dislike
for those from Santiago resulting in internal strife that
continued in the refugee centers. Perhaps if known earlier,
the centers could be established on a cultural basis derived
from information provided by the refugee population itself.
For example, refugees with common geographic ties could be
collocated in the center.
2 . Undesirables
The most advertised peculiarity of the freedom flotilla
was the alleged high number of "undesirables". It was reported
that at least 5,000 had admitted prison records and that
others were avowed homosexuals . Immigration officials recorded
16.41, or 152 of the sampled refugees at Eglin had spent some
time in jail. Less than half, however, were in prison at the
time of departure. [Ref. 16: p. 43] The debate over what is
a criminal again illustrates our low-context reliance on rules.
What did a prison record in Cuba really mean? There were
also claims of communist agitators in the centers with most
of the claims being generated from the refugees themselves.
For example, at Fort McCoy, refugees were segregated because
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fellow refugees had described them as "ant i -American agita-
tors." Approximately 30 of these refugees had to be placed
in separate barracks under guard for their own self protection
[Ref . 18: p. 1]
.
All of the sources implied that homosexuals, mur-
derers, prostitutes, and the mentally ill contributed to the
problems but provided little specifics. All interviews
indicated these were major problems but admitted the classi-
fication or identification of "undesirables" would be
unrealistic considering the time available and uncontrollable
outside factors.
In contrast to this analysis, one study that concluded
the refugees' experience in Cuba do not justify the alarming
charges of social undesirability , especially in terms of their
occupational histories [Ref. 16: p. 44]. The extent to which
the undesirables contributed to serious incidents is ambiguous
at best. The negative influence they had on the centers was
normally described in broad and general statements.
B. PROCESSING
**
Processing was an area of great concern for the refugees
and management. With the exception of mass riots and
Sources included interviews, after action reports, press
reports, and official message traffic.
**
Processing in this text refers to both in and out
processing. Many of the problems are similar in nature and
have a cumulative effect.
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demonstrations, processing acquired the most visibility from
the "outside world". The press, relatives, friends and those
who wished to sponsor a refugee sought glimpses of the refu-
gees upon arrival at the centers. Many of the friends and
relatives of the refugees expected them to be processed out
of the center within a few days. The refugees themselves
expected the processing to be faster than it actually was.
Each center organized the processing procedures independently
However, many similar concerns surfaced.
1 . Expectations
As with all rational bureaucratic operations there
was a plethora of administrative requirements to accomplish
before a refugee was authorized to enter or leave the center.
As the refugees arrived many had raised expectations that
they would be rapidly resettled. As one refugee said, "I
am in the land of freedom. I can have a car, marry an Ameri-
can girl and in 6 months have a house. Everything is easy
in America." The expectation of early sponsorship was con-
tinually reinforced by the interpreters at the processing
locations. Another refugee responded in this way to his
newly formed expectations: "I'm full of hope," said Hugo
Landa, 27, an engineering student in Cuba. "I think this
country is large and full of opportunities. Perhaps I will
clean the toilets, or be a millionaire." [Ref. 5: p. 42]
After weeks of remaining in the centers with little
if any progress made in meeting these expectations, the
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Figure 5.1. Refugee Arrival at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin,
June, 1980.
refugees became impatient. As a result of the temperamental
characteristics of the Cuban culture combined with the frus-
trating experience of unfulfilled expectations, their anger
was communicated through action. This anger took the form
of riots, demonstrations, and other acts of violence. The
net effect of not having their expectations filled was for
the Cubans to hold back until they could stand it no longer






Qualified interpreters were difficult to obtain.
They had a critical role in the operation. Time constraints
and total numbers required hampered the acquisition of
"quality" interpreters. In an interview, one interpreter
indicated that there was in excess of 800 interpreters at
the Fort McCoy center. She also said that translation abili-
ty had little or no influence in the pay, position, or
responsibility of the interpreter. In addition, interpreter
job performance was rarely if ever examined.
The interpreters were located by numerous methods
and their skills ranged from professors at the local univer-
sities to second year high school Spanish students. It was
noted that many of the refugees had difficulty understanding
the questions asked by the interpreters. Some refugees were
lucky to have the more proficient interpreters while others
suffered with those available. Common errors due to the
lack of linguistic skills possessed by the interpreters re-
sulted in inaccurate and incomplete documentation. For
example, some interpreters could not obtain the proper last
name from the refugee or his proper occupation. How much
of the information recorded by the interpreters was accurate?
Interviews with interpreter, August 19, 1982, Lacrosse,




How many refugees were misclassif ied? How many families
were separated due to the lack of skills possessed by the
interpreters?
It must be noted the interpreters ' role was critical
to the successful accomplishment of the operation. It was
the interpreters who initially classified the majority of
the refugees. Interpreters determined where the refugees
were to be located in the center, if other members of the
family accompanied them, any immediate medical problems, and
their prior arrest records. The thoroughness of their pro-
cessing procedures influenced the length of stay for the
refugee at the center. For example, errors in recording
skills of the refugees or names of friends and relatives in
the United States could greatly limit the possibility of
sponsorship. All of this data would have a direct impact on
the refugee's future.
3 . Contexting
Failure to take contexting differences into account
can cause problems. In the refugee operation, for example,
there was a high-context culture being misclassif ied under
the designs and whims of a low-context culture. The majority
of the interpreters came from a low-context culture as opposed
to the refugees who came from a high-context culture. Con-





High-context culture (Cuban) makes greater distinc-
tion between insiders and outsiders. People in positions of
authority take full responsibility for their actions. They
also tend to be polychronic; that is, they are likely to be
involved in a variety of activities with several different
people at any given time. On the other hand, low-context
cultures (interpreters, managers of centers, military offi-
cials) do not place a great distinction between insiders and
outsiders. People in positions of authority diffuse respon-
sibility to lowest possible levels. They are monochronic in
nature; that is, one thing at a time. The two systems --
low-context and high-context can be compared to oil and
water; they do not mix [Ref. 12: p. 150].
One point that needs to be emphasized is that on
arrival the refugees were told by a low-context, monochronic
person that they would be in the refugee center for a few
days, maybe a week. This type of reference to time has a
different meaning to a culture which is polychronic.
In one instance, the refugees were given specific
time schedules to meet for meals, clothing issue, and trans-
portation. The refugees did not comply with these schedules
forcing the center to operate these activities on an unsched-
uled basis [Ref. 15: p. I-VII-J-1]. Thus, the center was
transformed from monochronic to polychronic in nature without
realizing what had taken place. Failure to take into account
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contexting could be a contributing factor leading to serious
incidents. As E. T. Hall said in his book, Beyond Culture
,
if a low-context person interacts with a high-context culture
and does not really think things through to foresee all con-
tingencies, he is headed for trouble [Ref. 12: p. 127].
C. INTERNAL CONFLICT
As the population in each center increased with unanti-
cipated speed so did the frustrations, misunderstandings,
expectations of sponsorship, and the anxiety level. The
"newness" of the refugee center rapidly deteriorated as the
reality of the slow processing procedures became apparent.
As a result internal conflicts increased and ranged from
simple thefts of cigarettes to pay for gambling debts to
stabbings of alleged Castro agents.
1. Self Protection
A major concern of the managers was the abundance of
weapons the refugees acquired. This is an interesting facet
of the refugee's culture contrasted to that of the center's
administration. To the Cubans, "You are not a man unless
you have a knife." In the United States culture, a person
possessing knives may be perceived as a criminal.
Refugee vs refugee (totally within the center)
.




As mentioned in Chapter Four, an astonishing number
of weapons were found. Why did the Cubans have these weapons
and from whom did they acquire them? The great availability
of material within the refugee housing area that can be con-
verted into deadly weapons makes the control of such weapons
impractical, if not impossible. This led to a significant
number of serious assaults between refugees and posed a threat
to military and civilian personnel working inside the refugee
areas. Incidents of violence increased proportionately as
the "more desirable" refugees were resettled first, leaving
behind those who were "less desirable" to become increasingly
frustrated and perhaps more hostile the longer they remained.
[Ref. 17: p. 17]
The possession of weapons was justified by the refu-
gees as being needed for self defense. Some incidents appar-
ently occurred in the Cuban prisons and now there was an
opportunity to "pay back" those harmed. Another refugee
said, "I remember your face. I may have been unable at the
time to fight you, but I remember your face and there will
be a time I will be able to kill you."
There were specific incidents in which refugees tried
to purposely wound themselves. While some cases were attrib-
uted to those who were mentally ill, there was speculation
*




among medical personnel that other documented cases were an
attempt to avoid physical harm by other refugees.
2 . Temperament
The temperament of a people's culture must be taken
into consideration when a large number are confined in a
small areas as were the Cuban refugees. In particular, two
characteristics of the Latin culture were paramount in the
refugee operation and may be one of the major causes of as-
saults, riots and demonstrations, and the refugee's perceived
need for weapons. These are: self esteem and possession
of a quick temper. As an interpreter said, "Latins are hot
blooded and proud."
Perhaps these two characteristics led participants
to feel that fighting was a way of life for the refugees.
It is interesting to note that all the personnel involved in
the refugee operation, including the refugees, indicated
that fighting is a common occurrence in the Cuban culture.
The seriousness of the fighting is determined by the observers
of the culture. What appears to be fighting and serious to
one culture may be irrelevant to another.
An illustration occurred during the showing of motion
pictures at Fort McCoy.* When the projection equipment failed
the refugees began yelling and waving their arms. The uni-
formed American operators interpreted this as the beginning
See Appendix E (Culture)
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riot. On several occasions crowds would form and become
unruly. Upon investigation of the incidents it became obvi-
ous that in Cuba a projectionist with equipment problems can
expect verbal harrassment, but nothing more [Ref. 19: p. 3].
3. Geography
Another reason for conflict between the refugee pop-
ulation was the two distinct cultures in the population.
One was from the city of Santiago and was considered the less
educated, the peasants, the less wealthy of the Cuban culture.
The other faction came from Havana which was the more edu-
cated, the skilled workers, and the wealthy. These two
factions did not trust nor did they like each other. As a




Upon arrival there was an immediate need to structure
an organization which would function as a communication link
to the refugees in the center. How was this internal govern-
ment established? The initial Cuban leadership was selected
based on demonstrated leadership and reliance on known
political prisoners with leadership ability [Ref. 19: p. 3].
Since a political prisoner would espouse to the U.S. ways, he
would seem a logical choice for placement into a leadership
position. The problem faced by the management was identifying
refugees who were political prisoners. Complicating this
From interviews, See Appendix E.
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problem was the potential for selecting a number of Castro
agents who were among the refugees. The identification of
the initial leaders was an extremely difficult process.
Another criterion used to identify the initial lead-
ership for the internal government consisted of education
and technical or skill level. Who would be among the first
sponsored out of the center? Educated personnel, technical
or skilled workers were the first to be sponsored. As Cubans
were sponsored from the center, internal groups replaced the
leaders. These groups developed a strong power structure
within the center. Some of the internal government consisted
of hardened criminals who used their position to abuse other
refugees
.
As an example, at Fort McCoy the requirement to pro-
vide an internal security force capable of instantaneous
reaction to either prevent a crime of violence or to provide
normal police functions within the Cuban population was met
by forming a force identified through the use of purple wind-
breakers. The windbreakers rapidly became both a status
symbol and a point of dissention with the Cuban community.
The visibility of the jackets at every incident caused mixed
notoriety for this force [Ref. 17: p. 24]. This internal
government was known to have established its own prison in
a barracks building. Such actions illustrated how the in-
ternal government abused its power. They were more engrossed
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with power and politics than meeting the needs of the refu-
gee. Eventually this group was dissolved.
This abuse among the refugees and the constant shift
of "power" within the rival gangs formed a constant threat
to internal peace. Numerous gang coups occurred during the
later stages of the operation. Internal conflict seemed an
accepted norm for the refugee and may be indicative of their
environments in Cuba.
WlmW»
Figure 5.2. Fort McCoy Internal Security Force, July 1980
Interview with senior military official
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5 . Material Equity
The lack of materialistic uniformity posed another
concern for the administrators of the centers. In conjunc-
tion with card playing; gambling, prostitution, drug sales,
weapons sales also occurred. The refugees paid for these
items in a variety of ways; cash they brought from Cuba,
barter with materials issued by the center, and mail from
friends and relatives in the United States. Meal cards and
cigarettes, for example, were particularly popular barter
items. As a result of the informal bartering system and an
unequal distribution of wealth among the refugees the temp-
tation to steal increased. In fact, the thefts were so nu-
merous they became impossible to control and document.
There is little doubt that internal conflict contrib-
uted to serious incidents at the refugee centers. In fact,
some of the most violent and serious events occurred between
the refugees themselves. These incidents created a negative
environment for the centers and negative perceptions about
the refugees. The underlying causes of the internal conflict
surfaced from the refugee's need of self protection, geographic
cultural differences, the internal government, and the lack
of material equity.
D. LAW ENFORCEMENT
The ineffective and poorly coordinated law enforcement
system was incapable of anticipating, controlling, and
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preventing serious incidents. The number of agencies involved
with various degrees of jurisdiction at the centers was a
major concern. The primary agencies involved at all centers
were United States Marshalls, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, and the Military Police. There were secondary
agencies involved to include the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, Central Intelligence Agency, United States Park
Service, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Protective
Service, and various private sector security guards.
1. Legal Considerations
During the conduct of the refugee operations a mul-
titude of legal issues developed about the "legal rights and
status" of the refugee. There were also many legal issues
centered on the "legitimacy" of the various law enforcement
agencies. With North Americans being a low-context society,
many times they cannot state explicitly what the rules are.
They can only point to them when they are violated [Ref. 7:
p. 51]. In the case of the refugee centers we not only failed
to establish what the rules were, but also could not decide
who should enforce them. For the military, this proved to
be a continuous and sensitive issue. The ambiguous legal
status of the "refugees" and the role of the military regard-
ing their authority and jurisdiction prevented quick establish-
ment and rigorous enforcement of rules, regulations and laws
[Ref. 17: p. 19]. The tasking message on June 3, 1980, stated
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that the civilian law enforcement authorities had primary
responsibility for peacekeeping, law enforcement, and related
activities. It also tasked military commanders to provide
the manpower when the capability of the civilian agencies
was exceeded. These agencies were continually understaffed.
[Ref. 19: p. 4]
At Fort McCoy there was a necessity to use military
police inside the refugee enclave as a visible crime preven-
tion force but this force had no real authority. Military
authorities could not perform the most critical functions of
law enforcement due to legal constraints and Department of
Defense regulations. These critical functions included con-
ducting investigations, making arrests within the centers,
maintaining and guarding detention facilities. [Ref. 17:
pp. 17-19]
These legal ambiguities were not unique to the Cuban
operation. For example, in the Vietnamese operation the
lack of clear-cut authority and jurisdiction was dangerous
in that it was quickly perceived and exploited by those
refugees bent on making trouble [Ref. 20: p. I-V-I-l].
Interviews with civil affairs personnel, two of the
four installation commanders, and two mess hall workers
revealed that law enforcement structure was an ineffective
bureaucracy. The military was in a "no win" situation;
that is, either letting serious incidents occur on their
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installations or violating legal restrictions and regulations
in an attempt to control them.
2. Punishment
A major headache for management was to prevent un-
authorized departures. The strategy consisted of installing
fences (see Figure 5.3) and surrounding the fences with
security forces. When a violator was caught he was placed in
a more secure detention facility. The effort to contain
refugees was illustrated by the series of events concerning
the enclosure of the Fort McCoy center. Initially the barbed
wire was not installed to prevent the "concentration camp"
image. However, after the Fort Chaffee disturbance August
5, 1980, little or no objections were raised to the barbed
wire being placed on the fence. [Ref. 19: p. 2]
The communities surrounding the refugee centers had
deep interests in the number of unauthorized departures,
thus a majority of the military effort and resources was
expended on deterring and controlling fence jumping. This
effort was ineffective because placing refugees in a sepa-
rate and more secure section of the center had little effect
on the refugee. For example, an interviewed refugee said
that he was treated very nice in the detention facility and
this was not considered as punishment to him.
Another problem for the administration was the in-
ability to classify a refugee as a "troublemaker" and to
determine effective punishment for rule violations. As
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Figure 5.3. Juvenile Section Fence, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.
punishment remained either meaningless or nonexistent, other
acts of violence which included stabbings, prostitution, and
indecent exposure increased [Ref. 19: p. 4].
3 . Staffing
The civilian agencies were consistently understaffed.
In addition, most of their personnel had little or no experi-
ence in the basic principles of refugee or confinement oper-
ations. Detention of minor offenders; that is, fence jumpers
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was initially a matter of confusion as federal agency staff-
ing could not accommodate an additional category of offenders.
For example, at Fort McCoy a decision was made to hire guard
personnel under the auspices of Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) . The qualifications of this force were ques-
tionable. Another law enforcement force had to be hired
[Ref . 19: p. 4]
.
The problem of how to handle punishment and staff the
law enforcement agencies was not unique to the Cuban opera-
tion. During the Vietnamese operation (1975) the same
problems with inexperienced security forces caused quite
similar concerns [Ref. 21: p. 114].
The lack of a uniform and coordinated law enforcement
plan of action to include a properly trained staff contributed
to a majority of the serious incidents. By not taking mean-
ingful action against offenders, the refugee may have inter-
preted this as approval for undesirable behavior.
E. COMMUNICATIONS
There were several communication issues that related to
the potential for serious incidents. One of the key elements
in any successful refugee operation is the ability to effectively
communicate with the refugees. A critical element of that
communication is trust, and for the communication to be




Many forms of communications were used in the centers
to include bulletin boards, public address systems, Spanish
newspapers , Spanish radio stations, internal government,
interpreters, telephones with Spanish operators, motion
pictures, Spanish speaking government officials, and Spanish
speaking law enforcement officials. What is the probability
of the refugee interpreting the meaning from all these sources
as being consistent to him and his culture?
Due to the impersonal nature of these patterns these
communication techniques resembled those used in Cuba and
developed little trust between the sender and the receiver.
These communication techniques were American in content and
did little to join the high-context, polychronic receiver
with the low-context, monochronic sender. These communica-
tion patterns were on the technical level of Hall's TRIAD.
The use of informal communications by the refugees finally
bridged the gap.
Considering the rotation of military personnel and
units
,
informal communication patterns were never clearly
understood. This failure to establish complete and trust-
worthy communication channels resulted in needless broken
*




Reserve units rotated normally every two weeks, and
many active duty personnel were rotated every ninety days
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action chains. As Rene Spitz, the Swiss psychiatrist
states
,
If human beings are put in the position of having to cope
with the consequences of too many broken action chains
they will compensate. The compensations will ultimately
become so numerous as to block or prohibit NORMAL behavior.
The culmination of this process he calls derailment of
dialogue, a term that indicates not only words but actions
as well. [Ref. 12: p. 148]
2. Rumors
Information was transmitted to the refugees by a
variety of informal sources. The informal sources were the
internal security patrols, dining facilities workers, inter-
preters, and other civilian workers in the center. The
majority of information was factual, but too often it degen-
erated into rumor or reinforced existing rumors. Examples
of these rumors include:
"You will be out in four or five days."
"There is a whore house nearby."
"When Reagan is elected, he will ship us back."
"They are going to turn Fort McCoy into a prison."
"Volunteer agencies are selling sponsorships."
The majority of the rumors were unsubstantiated, but
because they were transmitted in the informal network, they
were accepted. Rumors such as being shipped back to Cuba,
and the centers being transformed into prisons were a major




Rumors concerning the refugee's future (specifically
gaining sponsorship) could be directly linked to the cause
of riots and demonstrations. For example, there were rumors
circulating in the Fort McCoy center that a person from one
of the VOLAGs was selling refugees. This started a demon-
stration where approximately 300 refugees carried signs
saying they had not come to the United States to be sold
like cows and horses [Ref. 22: p. 1]
.
These particular problems are not unique. An identi-
cal incident occurred with the Vietnamese refugee on July
16, 1975 at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, where 300 refugees
participated in a demonstration sparked by charges that one
of the VOLAGs used favoritism in determining the resettlement
of certain refugees [Ref. 20: p. IV-XII-1].
It should be noted the communications section refers
to the specific topic areas concerning the sources and
rumors. The communications issue is much more complex and
is immersed in other areas to include demographics, process-
ing, internal conflict, and law enforcement. The ability or
inability to transfer information from one culture to another





The ability to understand other cultures will provide a
better understanding of our own culture. Specifically, in
any refugee operation, cultural concerns for the operation
of the centers should be a major issue addressed by manage-
ment. For management to be aware of the idea that people
from different cultures think differently is a key ingredient
for the success of any refugee operation. One point we have
discovered from past refugee operations is that we have failed
to learn from them and we continue to make the same mistakes.
In particular, we have failed to anticipate and control seri-
ous incidents as well as recognize the contributing factors
to those incidents . The differences between the Cuban refugee
operation and past refugee operations have not been that great
Serious incidents were a common occurrence in all of the
Cuban refugee centers and were the catalyst which led to the
development of the list of contributing factors.
A. THE SERIOUS INCIDENTS
The serious incidents which were found to be prevalent
in all centers were unauthorized departures, assaults and
weapons possession, riots and demonstrations, and other in-
dividual acts of violence. All of these incidents raised
the anxiety and concerns of the American public, the center's
management, and the refugee population.
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Why are these serious incidents important? They illus-
trate the serious impact when two cultures collide in a time
intense, high anxiety, severely stressful environment. These
serious incidents served as the catalyst for investigating
the contributing factors.
B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
The contributing factors to the serious incidents were
analyzed using the cultural concepts of E. T. Hall. The
areas which have been identified as contributing factors to
serious incidents are population characteristics, processing,
internal conflict, law enforcement, and communication. For
each of these areas a series of questions can be asked to
highlight the cultural relevancy. The following list was
developed not as an all inclusive traditional checklist, but
rather a tool to aid management in coping with the undesirable
phenomena in a multi -culture environment.
Population Characteristics
How will the refugee be classified upon arrival and what
are the implications of the classification?
When assigning living areas what cultural specifics should
be taken into consideration?
What attributes make a refugee "undesirable" and what
special considerations must be taken?





What will be the refugee's expectations of the center and
the nation?
What will be the management's expectations of the refugee
and his culture?
What will the qualifications be for interpreters?
Will the interpreters, with the skill they possess, properly
classify refugees?
How will the interpreters' performance be evaluated?
How will the characteristics of the refugee and his culture
influence the classification?
How will processing decisions and procedures be affected
by the refugee's culture?
How will context (high/low) be taken into consideration
when processing refugees?
Will the refugee population be polychronic or monochronic?
How will refugee's time frame of reference be taken into
consideration when making plans and schedules?
Internal Conflict
Will the refugees feel the need for self protection and
why?
What plan will be used to control weapons/drugs?
Will internal dissention which began in their homeland be
a relevant factor to consider?
Will there be a need for an internal government and if so,
how will it be established?
What will be the role of the internal government and how
will it provide feedback to management?
What action will be taken to prevent the internal govern-
ment from abusing its power?




Who will be in charge and how will the law enforcement
needs be coordinated?
What will be the impact of the legal environment on man-
agement of the refugees?
Will there be a need for punishment and who will administer
it?
What will the refugee's perception of punishment entail?
How will the "concentration camp image" be avoided?
How will teh law enforcement agencies be staffed?
Communication
How will we communicate with the refugee using both formal
and informal methods?
How will we develop a trust with the refugee?
How will disruptive rumors be controlled?
C. COMPENDIUM
People from different cultures have unconscious, ingrained
assumptions about personal space, interpersonal relations,
and the function of time. These different assumptions make
misunderstanding between peoples likely and destructive.
The Cuban refugee operation is an outstanding example of how
these misunderstandings evolved into serious incidents. Al-
though the large number of serious incidents appear to reflect
poorly on the Cuban culture; the question that should be
addressed is how many of these were brought about because of
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cultural interaction? It must be remembered that the major-
ity of the refugees did not come with the intent to commit
serious incidents.
The list of cultural considerations and questions may be
an initial step in the preparation for any type of multi-
cultural operation. Can one be totally prepared for such
operations? Probably not, but the questions might be worth
considering. Unfortunately, there are more questions than
answers, but at some time, possibly sooner than we like, we
will be forced to find the answers.




FORT MCCOY SERIOUS INCIDENTS
6 June 1980
Numerous incidents of Cubans attempting to scale fence.
Two military policemen received minor injuries.
8 June 198
A warehouse building destroyed by fire.
11 June 1980
7 Cubans found off post.
12 June 1980
3 Cubans sent to a hospital in critical condition for
drinking illegal homemade liquor. Two small disturbances
quelled.
15 June 1980
9 Cubans escaped from medium security detention facility
15 June 1980
13 Cubans escaped from detention facility. A number of
Cubans have self inflicted cuts. Doctors claim they are
feigning suicide attempts.
17 June 1980
Two interpreters attempt to smuggle refugee out of the
center.
18 June 1980




Unaccompanied juveniles are relocated for more control
and protection.
22 June 1980
Numerous incidents of fence jumping occurred.
2 3 June 19 3
Knife fight involving two Cubans occurred. An unknown
number of juveniles attached their barracks chief with weapons
A refugee accused of being a "Castro agent" taken into custody
25 June 1980
89 refugees having criminal histories were transferred
to federal prison. One Cuban attempted suicide and 53 impro-
vised weapons were confiscated.
26 June 1980
22 homemade weapons were found in juvenile barracks.
13 August 1980
A series of clashes between refugee groups occurred
involving 50 to 60 personnel. Approximately 20 refugees were
treated for injuries.
14 August 1980
Two buildings damaged by fire, arson suspected.
1 September 1980
A disturbance in the refugee holding occurred as refugees






Disturbances from previous day continued.
7 September 1980
300 refugees participated in a demonstration over slow
out processing procedures. Two thirds of the fencing around
the male section was torn down. Two recreation buildings
were damaged by fire, arson suspected.
8 September 1980
Building damaged by fire, arson suspected. Small demon-
stration of approximately 100 refugees occurred with 23
instigators being apprehended.
9 September 1980
Refugees restored the downed fence.
9 September 1980
Seven refugees escaped detention area.
22 September 1980
Building damaged by fire in juvenile area, arson suspected
29 September 1980




FORT CHAFFEE SERIOUS INCIDENTS
26 May 1980
A demonstration involving 200 to 300 Cubans, mostly
young males, occurred. Barriers were overturned and four
Cubans received injuries.
28 May 1980
Demonstration occurred by an estimated 1200 Cubans over
slow out processing.
30 May 1980
200 Cubans peacefully demonstrated along the main street
on the post.
31 May 1980
Approximately 50 to 70 Cubans stoned a vehicle belonging
to the U.S. Marshall. One fire was set near a barracks
building.
1 June 1980
A group of 1000 refugees marched to the main gate and
for reasons unknown, state troopers opened fire and wounded
five Cubans.
5 June 1980
200 families waiting for refugees demonstrated peacefully




Over 1400 homemade weapons were confiscated.
8 June 1980
60 Cubans transferred to federal facilities.
9 June 1980
Four refugees arrested for weapons possession, one for
attempted sodomy, one for robbery, and one for attempting to
incite a riot.
12 June 1980
31 Cubans detained as troublemakers were transferred to
federal facilities.
15 June 1980




FORT INDIANTOWN GAP SERIOUS INCIDENTS
5 June 1980
Two Cubans apprehended for breaking and entering resi-
dence of Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania.
6 June 1980
Cubans continued to be apprehended by local officials.
Two Cubans were identified as agitators.
9 June 1980
23 attempted fence jumpings and five destruction of
government property incidents were reported.
10 June 1980
Fence jumpings continued to occur.
16 June 1980
One Cuban admitted to hospital with stab wounds.
17 June 1980
Three Cubans apprehended off pot.
20 June 1980
Mess hall burglarized; 8 knives stolen.
25 June 1980
Numerous weapons were voluntarily turned in by the Cubans
in the family section.
5 August 1980




EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE SERIOUS INCIDENTS
15 May 1980
Four refugees attacked another refugee, who was alleged
to be a Castro agent. A riot occurred of 200 to 300 refugees
throwing debris.
15 May 1980
A commander request action to expedite out processing
due to the potentially dangerous environment.
25 May 1980
200 refugees involved in a rock throwing protest. Three





There were two interpreters interviewed who worked at
Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, during the summer of 1980. They trans
lated at the processing stations during the initial phase
as well as with the juveniles during latter phases. They
were interviewed on August 19 and 20, 1982, in Wisconsin.
The military officials interviewed represented a variety
of positions, responsibilities, and rank. Specifically, two
installation commanders, a key administrative advisor, a
primary staff officer, and a number of officials in the
Department of Defense were interviewed.
A civil affairs unit played an integral part in the es-
tablishment of Fort McCoy as a viable refugee center. Ten
members of that unit were interviewed on August 21, 1982, in
Green Bay, Wisconsin. There was one civil affairs civilian
who participated in the operation also interviewed.
Eleven Cubans were interviewed who were refugees at the
centers: 9 were at the Fort McCoy center, one at Fort
Indiantown Gap center, and one at Fort Chaffee center.
There was a number of support employees who participated
in the operation regarding the dining facilities. We inter-
viewed two--one, a supervisor over the entire food service
operation, and another who operated a dining facility. Both
served at Fort McCoy for the entire operation.
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The following statements summarize the data gathered
from personal interviews. Source codes are positioned at
the end of each statement. The following table lists the







Civil affairs military (CM)
Civil affairs civilian (CC)
Population Characteristics
The following are statements and comments from those
interviewed concerning the characteristics of the population
in the refugee centers. These were used as the foundation
for the development of the contributing factors of the
serious incidents.
Many did not know how to sign name (I)
Families were ashamed of the parasites in the center (I)
99% of the fights involved "lower class" refugees (I)
Homosexuals and juveniles were involved in riots and
demonstrations (I)
Educated refugees were from Havana (I,F,R)
Poorly educated refugees were from Santiago (J,F,R)
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Fence separated refugees (F,CA,R,M)
Juveniles were "street kids" (F,M)
Refugees from Havana and Santiago were
considered enemies (I,F,CA,R,M)
Problems with identification of family and relatives
(I,CA,M)
Homosexuals, murderers, prostitutes, contributed to
problems (I,CA,R,M)
Underground for homosexual accuterments (CA)
Mental illness was present (I,CA,M)
Cuba's parasites were sent by Castro (I,M)
Questionable release of political prisoners (I)
Some criminals were guilty of minor offenses (I,M)
Prison mentality (CA,M)
Political prisoners not allowed to come to U.S. (R)
Processing
The statements in the processing section concern both in
and out processing. Processing is a critical activity for
the managers of the refugee centers. The interview results
illustrate the multitude of issues which need consideration.
Military interpreters were a valuable asset (CA,M)
Jumped fences to look for sponsors (F,R)
Difficult to identify criminals (I,CA,M)
Refugees were classified by the way they looked (I,CA)




Classified into wrong compounds (I,R)
Slow processing procedures (I,F,CA,M,R)
Impatient refugees with respect to administrative
procedures (I,R,M)
Afraid of being sent to other refugee facilities in U.S.
(R)
Criminals and juveniles were not separated effectively (I)
Inadequate interpreter skills led to misclassif ication
(I,M,R)
Initially interpreters were not qualified to translate
(I,M,R)
Raised expectations with respect to sponsorship possibility
(I,F,CA,R)
5-10 days refugees became disenchanted (I,R)
There was confusion about classification of1 "families" (I,R)
Too many officials were in charge (I,F,CA,M)
Too much administration (I,M)
No uniform rules for processing among the various agencies
(I,CA,M)
To a refugee "in a while" has little meaning in reference
to time (I,CA,R)
Internal Conflict
The majority of those interviewed were quick to point
out their perceptions of causes of conflict among the refu-
gees. Many of the comments came from interviews with the
Civil Affairs personnel and military officials.
Hospital visits increased due to fear within the center (CA)




Created weapons for self protection (F,CA,R,M)
Factions were in constant conflict (F,CA,M)
Hats were symbols of authority (F,CA,M)
Former prisoners tended to migrate to old gangs (CA,M)
Internal conflict was spontaneous (CA,M)
Internal government acted as dictators (F,R,M)
Castro agents were confronted by fellow refugees (I,CA,M)
Lower class people punch each other (I)
Internal government was a focal point (I,CA)
Mobs of deprived refugees would try to rape each other (I,M)
Internal government consisted of hardened criminals (I,CA,M)
Lack of materialistic uniformity (I,F,CA,R,M)
Gambling (CA,R,M)
Enforcement
While the after action reports were concerned with the
jurisdiction and legal issues involving the enforcement
agencies, the interview results indicate a concern with per-
ceived lack of punishment.
No standardized punishment for fence jumping (M)
Agencies and units understaffed (CA,M)
Bureaucracy inhibited law enforcement (F,CA,M)
Light punishment for fence jumping (I,R,M)
Lack of uniformity labeling troublemakers (I,CA,M)
No segregation in detention compounds (I)
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Light, if any, punishment for stealing from each other
(I,M)
Feared Fort McCoy would be turned into Cuban prison (R)
Culture and Communication
Culture is communication. The interview results illustrate
the different perceptions we have of the Cuban culture as well
as their perceptions of our culture.
Political rumors; i.e. Reagan's possible election, incited
unauthorized departues (R)
Personnel turbulence contributed to lack of trust and
confusion (CA)
No respect for property (F,M)
Boredom (F,CA,M)
Latins are hot blooded and proud (I,R,M)
Fighting is part of their life (I,F,M,R,M)
Scared of military (F,M)
Military/government jargon; i.e. acronyms (F)
Knives are part of their life (F,M,R)
Juveniles were temperamental (I)
Cubans are a strong race (I)
Frustration was released by anger (I,M)
Possessed hatred for "the fence" (F,R,M)
Refugees' perception of U.S.:
"1967 refugees were successful" (M)
"Money paper in trees" (I)
"We came for freedom" (F ,CA,M, R, I , CC)
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"Anybody gets rich in U.S." (I,F)
"Everything easy, 6 months a house, car, money in bank"
(I,R)
"All that was on their mind was to marry American girl"
d,R)
"For the first time I now have all my clothes" (CA,R)
No continuity of agency management (I,M)
Treated as a piece of furniture .. .moved from one section
to another in the compound (I)
Girls in Cuba more passive (I)
Boys in Cuba more active (I)
American girls and Cuban males interpreted each other
differently (I,F,M)
Stupidity caused near fatal accidents (drinking antifreeze)
(I,CA,M)
Refugees wanted to see the country (R)
Refugees did not think they needed second language (I)
Lack of control over interpreters' duties (I,F)
Sexual obsession with female workers (F,M)
Entire operation was a "human disaster (M)
Undesirable information was "filtered" before it reached




1. Hamermesh, Mira, "Casualties of War and Peace," v. 3,
no. 4, 1979.




3. Hartlung, Poul, "Abstract from Acceptance Speech for 1981
Nobel Peace Prize," World Refugee Survey 1982 , 1982.
4. Tripp, Rosemary, E. gen. ed. World Refugee Survey 1982
,
v . 1 : Refugee Review, United States of America , United
States Committee for Refugees, 1982
.
5. "Cuba's Boat People- -Dilemma for Carter," United States
News and World Report
,
May 5, 19 80.
6. Sherbinin, Michael, World Refugee Survey 1981 , v. 1,
United States Commission for Refugees , United States
Committee for Refugees, 1981
.
7. Hall, Edward T., The Silent Language , Doubleday, 1959.
8. Hall, Edward T., The Hidden Dimension , Doubleday, 1966.
9. Sapir, Edward, Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in
Language, Culture, and Personality , ed. D. G. Mandelbaum,
University of California Press, 1949
.
10. Montero, Darrel, Vietnamese Americans: Patterns of
Resettlement and Socioeconomic Adaptation in the United
States \ Westview Press, 1979
11. Battelle Columbus Labs, Civil Interaction During Military
Operations in Built-up Areas
,
Part II, July 1973.
12. Hall, Edward T., Beyond Culture
,
Doubleday, 1976.
13. United States Department of the Army, Civil Affairs
Operations
,
FM 41-10, October 1969.






15. Department of the Army, Headquarters, United States
Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Task Force
Resettlement Operation , Fort Sill, Oklahoma"^ June 9
,
1982.
16. Bach, Robert L. , "The New Cuban Immigrants Their Back-
ground and Prospects," Monthly Labor Review , October,
1980.
17. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Task Force Refugee
(Provisional), After Action Report
,
Fort McCoy,
Wisconsin, October 8, 1980
.
18. "Cubans Leave Compound," The Tomah Journal , June 12,
1980.
19. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Task Force Refu-
gee (Provisional), "Executive Summary," Fort McCoy,
Wisconsin, October 8, 1980.
20. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Task Force New
Arrivals, After Action Report , Fort Chaffee, Arkansas,
December, 1975.
21. Department of the Army, Army Command and General Staff
College, Operation New Life: Camp Orote--A Study in
Refugee Control
,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June, 1976.








1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Department Chairman, Code 54 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Professor J. W. Creighton, Code 54Cf 2
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Professor R. A. McGonigal, Code 54Mb 2
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
6. Major Patrick E. Garren 3
5920 Bissonette, Apt. ^98
Houston, Texas 77081
7. Captain Frank G. Helmick 3
3011 Lazy Spring Drive
Houston, Texas 77080
8. Professor Carson Eoyang, Code 54Eg 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
9. Assistant for Analysis, Evaluation (NMPC-6C) 1
Human Resources Management § Personal
Affairs Department




10. Director, Human Resource Management
Division (NMPC-62)
Human Resource Management § Personal
Affairs Department
Navy Military Personnel Command
Washington, D.C. 20370
11. Director for HRM Plans and Policy (OP-150)
Human Resource Management Division




Human Resource Management School
Naval Air Station Memphis
Millington, Tennessee 38054
13. Commanding Officer
Human Resource Management Center London
Box 23
FPO New York 09510
14. Commanding Officer




Human Resource Management Center
Naval Training Center
San Diego, California 92133
16. Commanding Officer
Organizational Effectiveness Center § School
Fort Ord, California 93941
17. Commanding Officer
Human Resource Management Center




Human Resource Management Detachment
NAVSTA Box 18 7
Mayport, Florida 52205
19. Mr. Jeff Clark DAMH-HOC
The Chief of Military History §





Human Resource Management Center
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 96860
21. Commander
Combat Development Experimental Command
Fort Ord, California 93941
22. COL Moran
Commander
Readiness Group, Fort McCoy
Sparta, Wisconsin 54656
23. Major Meyer
U.S. Department of the Army
432nd Civil Affairs Unit
Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305
24. Assistant Secretary of the Army





Newport, Rhode Island 02840
26. Commander
United States Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
27. Commander
National Defense University
Armed Forces Staff College
Norfolk, Virginia 23551
28. Commander
Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
29. Commanding General
Fleet Marine Force Atlantic
ATTN: G-5
Norfolk, Virginia 23551
30. Commandant of the Marine Corps
(Code MC-PA)





Historical Office, Office of the
Chief of Staff
U.S. Army Forces Command
Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330
32. Defense Logistics Systems Information
Exchange
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center




















3 2768 002 01063 9
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
m
WW
$15 •'.• IS&xk&SSs$B
fcftll
tWOCKi
mL
